Once More unto the Breach

MeeGo: Nokia, Intel and the Future of the Mobile Internet Platform

This week Intel and Nokia announcement the merge of Intel's Moblin and Nokia's Maemo platforms into MeeGo, a single platform for mobile computing. This is a great announcement for a number of reasons.

Nokia demonstrated it's ability to participate within active open source communities as it developed and launched the N770 tablet as a consumer device and maemo as a computing platform several years ago. (The N770 pre-dates the iPhone.) This wasn't a cut and run on the Linux kernel to grab a fork then forever be stuck supporting it. This was an excellent demonstration to themselves that they could use an active royalty free OS and continue to share the development costs. Ari Jaaksi's report on the experience is enlightening. Nokia has since acquired TrollTech, released the Qt tool kit appropriately, (and then acquired Symbian Ltd. and released its handset OS software assets into the open source wild through the Symbian Foundation).

Intel developed and released Moblin over the past few years as a Linux distro for mobile computing. They carefully positioned it NOT for handsets, but for all the other cool mobile Internet devices in your life like tablets and in-vehicle systems. They could do lots of interesting device related work on the Linux kernel for things in which the mainstream Linux wasn't interested and still get the cost advantages from shared development for the platform as a whole. In a very short time it has become one of the more interesting Linux distributions from a hardware innovation perspective.

The positioning is key here. By focusing this on "mobile Internet devices" they avoid the whole iPhone versus Android debate, Windows Mobile has no comment to make, LiMo is still wandering in the wilderness, and Symbian isn't in a position to comment. All of those are thought of as handset operating systems. This is future forward and about the mobile Internet. And don't just think iTouch and tablets in the coffee shop. Think of your home as a wifi space. Microsoft and Apple continue to demonstrate that people DON'T want another PC in the living room for media management. So what are all the other devices you can imagine in your home that are NOT "computers" that could become the synchronization hub of your world's information and media.

• What about a wifi device suctioned to my refrigerator door where the shopping lists are kept and the family calendar at a glance (with reminders),
• or a device that looks like a VoIP phone with a wireless handset in a stand that also has the family phone book(s) in it, but synchronizes with your mobile phone handsets for calendars and contacts,
• or what if my "media centre" didn't look like a media centre at all, but was a tablet that talked to a black box shoved out of site behind the couch, but would also sync my mobile phone or Kindle or Nokia N900 Internet Tablet,
• or there was a small charging pad on the kitchen counter where keys and mobile phones and personal media players are dropped to sync across family calendars, contacts, and the latest episode of a show I'll watch or listen to on tomorrow's commute (while inductively charging my phone).
• What if all these devices could communicate with one another?

All of these imaginings will need an operating system. Microsoft may have made computing in the home ubiquitous in a PC-centric world, but no consumer OEM or ODM today will want to repeat history and watch all high margin profits go to a single software company via royalties. Maintaining individual forks of Linux isn't cost effective either. But sharing the value creation of a robust complete applications platform in an open source project free to all would certainly answer the call.

The Microsoft versus TomTom Patent Debate is about the Mobile Internet not Linux

The Linux community is up in arms over Microsoft's filing a patent infringement suit against TomTom, the Dutch navigational unit manufacturer, determined to convey this as an opening move in the debate about what patents Linux does or doesn't infringe. This suit is very likely NOT about Linux. Let's look at the patents. From the complaint, Microsoft patents in the case (collectively, “the Microsoft patents-in-suit”):

• 6,175,789 (16 January, 2001) Vehicle computer system with open platform architecture
• 7,054,745 (30 May, 2006) Method and system for generating driving directions
• 6,704,032 (9 March, 2004) Methods and arrangements for interacting with controllable objects within a graphical user interface environment using various input mechanisms
• 7,117,286 (3 October, 2006) Portable computing device-integrated appliance
• 6,202,008 (13 March, 2001) Vehicle computer system with wireless internet connectivity
• 5,579,517 (26 November, 1996) Common name space for long and short filenames
• 5,758,352 (26 May, 1998) Common name space for long and short filenames
• 6,256,642 (3 July, 2001) Method and system for file system management using a flash-erasable, programmable, read-only memory

Also from the complaint, we have this statement (line 15):

6. Upon information and belief, Defendants are in the business of developing, manufacturing, and selling portable navigation computing devices and software for use on those devices, personal computers, PDAs, and smartphones (hereinafter known collectively as “Portable Navigation Devices and Software”).

This feels much more like positioning for location-based services and the coming mobile Internet war. Microsoft has been the "PC company" for a long time. It got there on the backs of a standardized PC "device". (In a Christensen economic world of a network of complements, Microsoft captured the innovation premium in the OS on commodity hardware.) That world is changing rapidly since Apple demonstrated what the mobile Internet can look like with the release of the iPhone. There has been a rush of delivering iPhone competitors to market since then. Nokia bought Navteq, then Symbian (the predominant mobile OS), to be released royalty free and as open source sometime in the future. Google released Google Maps with instructions to drive places, and then developed and released Android. There are considerably more handset devices on the planet than PCs [see note below]. This feels like a much bigger fight than the first shots in a Linux patent fight. This could have much bigger ramifications for Nokia (and the other handset manufacturers), Google, and Apple than Red Hat et al. These are the players that need to be naming themselves to this patent litigation suit.

Related commentary:

• Microsoft v. TomTom: Patent war, or no?, () Matt Asay's fine blog commentary
• Microsoft sues TomTom for alleged patent infringement, (25 February, 2009) by Ina Fried
• Has Microsoft's Patent War Against Linux Begun?, (25 February, 2009) Glyn Moody's commentary
• Beating the TomTom: Drums of War? (Not), (26 February, 2008) Andy Updegrove's excellent commentary
• Microsoft lawyer 'won't speculate' on Linux suits, (25 February, 2008) Ina Fried's CNET interview with Microsoft's Horatio Gutierrez, senior IP lawyer
• The Microsoft Press Release, (25 February, 2009)

Note: Communities Dominate Brands pointed out that there were 3.3 Billion mobile subscriptions in 2007 versus 900 Million PCs. Or to put this in better context:

Now as the phone handset makers like Nokia, Samsung, Motorola, SonyEricsson and LG ship over a billion phones annually (IDC, Jan 2007), we have a colossus of an industry of high tech pushing ever more powerful gadgets into our pockets. And yes, Nokia alone ships one million phones every day of the year, Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays included. For contrast note that the PC industry shipped 250 million new PCs in 2007, of which about 100 million are laptops (Computer Industry Almanac Jul 2007).

OSBR Article on Open Source and the Mobile Internet

The Open Source Business Resource is an academically sponsored body of work published each month out of Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. I've an article in this month's issue. Regular readers will recognize a lot of themes they've read here or heard me discuss and present. The focus is on the coming mobile Internet and open source software. I would encourage people that want to comment to hold the discussion on the article's website.

The Arrival of the Mobile Internet Thanks to the Economics of Open Source Software
Walli, S. 2009 Jan 5. The Arrival of the Mobile Internet Thanks to the Economics of Open Source Software. Open Source Business Resource [Online] 0:0. Available: http://www.osbr.ca/ojs/index.php/osbr/article/view/818/790

Nokia and the Symbian Foundation Opportunity - Part II

The previous post looked at the Nokia acquisition of Symbian from the competitive perspective. Let's now look at the opportunities and challenges for Nokia and the new Symbian Foundation. Remember that assuming successful regulatory approval, there will be no Symbian Ltd. anymore. Nokia will need to manage the challenges that come with any acquisition. When you buy a company, you essentially acquire the assets (in this case the software), the intellectual capital of the employees, and the customers.

This acquisition is particularly interesting as key Symbian Ltd. shareholders and customers have banded together to deliver the primary software assets into a not-for-profit organization. There's a great white paper outlining the initial strategy on the currently minimalist Symbian Foundation site.

Essentially:

• Nokia will acquire the remaining shares of Symbian Ltd. that it doesn't already own.
• Symbian Ltd. employees become Nokia employees.
• Fujitsu, Motorola, Nokia, NTT DOCOMO, and Sony Ericsson (all Symbian Foundation board members with the exception of Fujitsu) will contribute SymbianOS, S60, UIQ, MOAP and related software and documentation assets to the newly formed foundation.
• The initial board directors will be AT&T, LG, Motorola, Nokia, NTT DOCOMO, Samsung Electronics, Sony Ericsson, STMicroelectronics, Texas Instruments and Vodafone.
• The foundation launches (expected in early 2009) and all the assets will be available to members under a royalty-free license.
• A new platform will be developed from SymbianOS and S60 with selected components of UIQ and MOAP. The first release of the unified Symbian Foundation platform is expected to be available during 2009. The platform will offer the means to build a complete mobile device while providing the tools to differentiate devices through tailoring of the user experience, applications and services.
• The new platform is to be backwards compatible with SymbianOS v9 and S60 3rd Edition.
• Platform assets will be made available as open source gradually over the next 2 years, with the intent to use the Eclipse Public License (EPL) 1.0, making the platform code available to all for free.

Most of this is fantastic news. The economics of code sharing, value preservation of the intellectual asset, and innovation capture will be delivered through the foundation with the primary stakeholders sharing the costs. This is a perfect example of the economics of shared development in this particular market space and "why open source software."

Organization and governance of the new Foundation will be key. The foundation is open to all and membership will cost US$1500. The primary board members will share all the operational costs. This seems a reasonable way to manage the cost — it's likely much cheaper than historical royalty payments and it scales well versus a fixed premium membership fee structure seen in other places. The white paper describes the functioning of the foundation based on the following structure.

As a side observation, it would behoove Intel to get involved early on, conceivably as a primary board member and share the costs. As the mobile world of phones and laptops converge, they should be investing beyond moblin.org. That is NOT to say that the mobile world will be a single class of devices in the future, but rather the space will overlap for some time and I would think Intel would want to participate as widely as possible.

So where are the edges that need to be carefully considered in the new Symbian Foundation?

• While the foundation is open to all, and the list of membership benefits is well defined today (in the white paper), one of the benefits reads: Right to access and modify foundation source code, and contribute code to the foundation. This needs to be rethought along the lines of how the Eclipse Foundation manages committers and contributors. The Symbian Foundation is deliberately cutting off unknown sources of contribution if they make it a membership benefit. There is no loss of control in encouraging (and vetting) contributions from as wide a population as possible. Putting gates around the community early, or discouraging contributors looks arrogant and risks the community's participation and growth at precisely the time when it is most needed. Microsoft certainly demonstrated how fast you could pour cold water on a community with the Rotor project. Motorola had its early Linux community vanish. Heavy-handed control and "we know best" attitudes hampered the early critical growth of the OpenSolaris community. Who knows what sources of innovation will be cut off (and will defect to other projects) with this gate in place.
• "Backwards compatibility" as an absolute goal. This is not a bad thing per se, but it feels like the backwards compatibility requirement exists to deal with a long delivery cycle — essentially asking developers to begin developing today for the open source platform delivery in two years and the promise that the investment will be protected. All complex dynamic software hits a point in its evolution where a re-write is required. (The Linux kernel rewrote the entire VM and scheduler after about 10 years of evolution with modern architectures.) Backwards compatibility becomes the challenge. But the opportunity forward MUST be bigger than the backwards compatibility option. It needs to be managed in the community, i.e. this is a community issue and a delivery time-line issue. Think of the opportunity that Microsoft took moving from the Windows world of the late nineties to the new world enabled by NT. Think of the enormous opportunity Apple took moving from Mac OS9 to Mac OSX. Think of developing a community of innovation forward like the Mozilla world and Eclipse.
• The whole two-year process feels like a traditional corporate engineering culture trying to manage change around a well established product space. This would be great if this was what Symbian Ltd. was to remain (but even then it risks being a dead-end overtaken by other solutions with the coming mobile Internet wave). When IBM began the Eclipse Project, they put safe IP structures around a software base, some simple governance and a road map in place, and got on with the work. Later, the Eclipse Foundation was created as a better way to manage the inbound innovation and growth under a well defined IP regime. Now, the Eclipse Foundation and Mozilla Corp. provide excellent blueprints for what the Symbian Foundation needs to be. Nokia already has the inhouse experience to build from those blueprints. Engineering cultural change is difficult but essential here. While one wouldn't expect Symbian Ltd. to release its core assets while awaiting regulatory approval, there have to be other complementary software assets internally available that could be released as early experiments to begin to get the IT structure in place and begin the cultural learning. Two years gives Android and LiMo and even Windows Mobile too much time to erode a community that should rightly be coming to the Symbian Foundation.

These are all key issues. Cultural change is hard in any acquisition. In this case it is doubly so for an engineering team used to delivering to a particular set of customer requirements now dropped into an open source world and needing to understand how open source works and customers and users differ, as well as for a business team used to driving platform revenue and profitability that need to consider now driving platform adoption as an end goal unto itself.

The Symbian Foundation is an opportunity not to simply re-invent the mobile phone platform, but to build the most innovative shared platform forward for the coming mobile Internet. Working with peer organizations like the Eclipse and Mozilla foundations, and arguably the Android project, a stable dynamic open source platform can be created that best suits the needs of customers and consumers for some time to come. Nokia's vision and foresight open up amazing possibilities. Here's wishing them speedy success.

Nokia and the Symbian Foundation Opportunity - Part I

Sixty days ago, Nokia announced it was buying the rest of Symbian Corp., and would then open source SymbianOS using the Eclipse Public License through a newly created Symbian Foundation. This is a great announcement. Stephen O'Grady did an excellent Redmonk Q&A analysis at the time. Nat Torkington also had cogent analysis on what it may mean with respect to Android. There was lots of other commentary, however, that wanted to portray this as a last ditch effort against Android, Linux and LiMo, and the coming wave of the iPhone. Let's step back for a moment.

This is a fantastic exit for Symbian. They're celebrating their 10th anniversary at the peak of their game with enormous market share, but there was going to be trouble on the horizon. If you saw the Symbian presentations of a couple of years ago, they all looked to China, India, and the other developing economies and assumed a proportionate claim of market share. But here's the rub — when you start talking a few dollars royalty per handset then royalties quickly fall into the billions of dollars when you consider "handsets for [India | China]". For a billion dollars, I can start thinking about other alternative operating systems and indeed that's what Symbian's primary shareholders began doing.

Motorola delivered the Ming phone into China on a cut-down Linux base. This was almost a year before the iPhone "happened" and for the Chinese market was arguably a much more useful "phone". (Full stylus input for Chinese characters — think about that and texting.) The Ming was the first 2MP pixel camera (with business-card-to-contacts-database software that worked with the camera), a media player, and came in a sleek package. This was likely just the beginning of the shift away from SymbianOS in emerging markets, especially considering there are Chinese companies working on cut-down Linux-for-mobile platforms as well.

The announcement was a great acquisition for Nokia. For on the order of two years of royalty payments to Symbian, they now own the whole asset, regardless of whether they share it. But Nokia too was considering how to best work in the open source community and using Linux as a base for around the N770/N800 series Internet tablets.

Let's look at the competitive landscape for a moment before looking at the enormous opportunity in front of Nokia and the Symbian Foundation.

The "Competitors"
The iPhone isn't competition for SymbianOS. The iPhone, true to Apple's history of profitability over market share and its cult of design and usability, is an amazing consumer experience. The complete Apple experience depends upon controlling the entire technology stack in a tightly integrated fashion. In Christensen economic models, the iPhone is a new class of product and will deliver more value to its customer target over the coming years through tight control and integration than can be delivered through standardized interfaces and components, and Apple will reap the margin benefits. That same focus on function and design also means Apple will never own 65% of the global market — it won't be producing $25 iPhones for Africa anytime soon. What Apple has demonstrated to the mobile industry with the iPhone is what the mobile web experience can be. They may have "only" sold a couple million units in their first year, but they are driving 65% of the web's mobile traffic on iPhones/iTouch devices (stat from Jason Grigsby's excellent OSCON presentation). The iPhone is an innovation example for Symbian, not a competitive threat.

Google's Android is interesting. Google wants to drive application development with Android that uses Google services to find ways to grow their ad revenue as the mobile web comes into its own. They are discovering the difficulties of delivering a handset OS — something around which the Symbian engineering team has a lot of experience. Since Google isn't actually a device company, this feels like an opportunity for each of them to explore their complementary spaces. Google application services running on a Symbian base would seem to be a win for Google and application developers trying to settle on a model while allowing Symbian to do what it does best and focus on developing a strong developer community. Since the Symbian Foundation will not be under a market competitive revenue gun, profit-centric competitive decisions are removed that might have historically put co-operating with Google at risk. Android should be an opportunity, and not a competitive threat.

LiMo was created to provide a common Linux fork for mobile. The mobile handset manufacturers have shared technology through Symbian Inc. for ten years. As the industry changed and the royalty became a problem, they all wrestled with Linux. They need a royalty free OS, but trying to integrate into the Linux community has been a source of frustration for quite some time. Things that are critically important to handset manufacturers aren't necessarily even interesting to the mainstream Linux community. Each handset manufacturer was forced to fork their own. Before Android (a company-centric platform from a non-device company) and before Symbian became open source, LiMo was likely the best opportunity for a shared royalty-free platform. The most damning thing for LiMo pre-Symbian was probably Nokia's proven ability to work in the open source community to develop the N770 without a fork. The Symbian Foundation use of the Eclipse Public License will also likely make handset manufacturers much more comfortable — the EPL IBM-lineage ensured that the hardware patent clause was still intact. So LiMo is not a competitive threat for Symbian, but the reverse is not so true.

Windows Mobile is not interesting. Microsoft has seen mobile computing coming for sometime, but there are several problems. First there's the royalty problem. Second there's the open source culture versus IP protection problem, both internally and from an external partner perspective. Lastly, there's a very subtle cultural problem. In the early days of mainframes and minicomputers, users thought in terms of a data record/transaction metaphor. The PC introduced users to a document metaphor for computing. The mobile phone space uses a communications metaphor. Microsoft thinks of the mobile phone space as a small powerful PC used to read Word documents to drive data revenues for the mobile network operators, and that's not the sort of mindset the handset manufacturers have. (Another startling statistic from Jason Grigsby's excellent OSCON presentation: 2007 SMS revenues were $100B, which is more than the Hollywood box office, DVD sales and rentals, the music industry, and video game sales combined.) So while Windows Mobile was interesting in a pre-Symbian Foundation world, it still only had a quarter of the deployment of SymbianOS, and now Symbian will be royalty free. So Windows Mobile is not a competitive threat for Symbian, but the new Symbian Foundation done right will definitely threaten Windows Mobile.

It was interesting to see almost no discussion over the past couple of months around Ubuntu Mobile Internet Device (MID) Edition or Intel's Mobile Linux project (moblin.org). Each of them are carefully not targeting the mobile phone space but are forward looking to "the mobile internet" using in-vehicle devices and netbooks as their examples. It will be interesting to see how this space evolves as the mobile phone grows up into the space, and the laptop/notebook space shrinks down.

Next we'll look at the opportunity in front of the Symbian Foundation: Nokia and the Symbian Foundation Opportunity - Part II

Ari Jaaksi on Nokia and Open Source and the N770

Ari Jaaksi is head of open source software operations at Nokia, and is responsible for Nokia's N770/N800 and maemo.org initiatives.  When Nokia developed the software platform for the N770 internet tablet, they determined early on to use as much open source software as was feasible to deliver the device.  In a white paper on Ari's blog, he details the early learnings at Nokia around open source and product delivery.   

The concise 10 pages is stunning and worth the read in its entirety.  Nokia worked with a Debian 2.6 kernel, GNOME, the Hildon framework, and D-Bus to name a few open source components. Here's just a sampling of some of the observations:

On working in communities:

We used existing open sourced components such as the gnuchess chess game engine, bzip2 data compressor, id3lib for manipulating ID3v1 and ID3v2 tags in digital audio files, and many more as such, whenever that was possible. The bigger the component or subsystem was, the better. When possible, we reused an entire subsystem and subsystem architectures, such as GNOME [GNOME 2006] and Debian [Debian 2006]. Instead of separate components we reused architectural blocks that already integrate several independent components.

In several cases we sponsored the development of existing components, such as the Linux kernel, DBUS, GNOME-VFS, GTK+, GStreamer, and OBEX to make them better meet our requirements. The additional work was needed especially in the areas of UI and usability, power management, performance, and memory management. Our engineers worked directly with communities participating development projects. We also hired and asked developers within the communities to enhance components based on our needs.

On cost savings:

The biggest cost savings came from the utilization of already available components. We utilized several free components and subsystems as such, with no modifications.

We also improved several components to better meet our requirements. Such improvement is cheaper than creating the needed functionality from scratch.

Some 2/3 of the code of the Nokia 770 is licensed under an open source license. These components made it possible for us to build the software cheaper than we could have done using closed and proprietary technologies.

On code quality:

If we compare the code from open source to the code developed by us, our conclusion is that open source is of better quality. We have more bugs and problems in the Nokia developed code. This is only natural because the majority of the Nokia code is build from scratch and is thus very young. Open source code, on the other hand, has mostly been used by others already. They have fixed the most severe errors already before we started to use the code.

If we compare open source code to commercial components used on our platform, the quality difference is not that obvious. The commercial components have typically been used by others, too. That has improved their quality.

On engineering flexibility:

Open source is flexible when we needed to fix a problem or change functionality. We often requested bug fixes or modifications to the commercial closed components on our platform. If the vendors didn’t have the capacity or will to fix the problem on time, we had few options. We could not fix problems  ourselves because the companies using closed source didn’t want us to access their source code. With open source components, though, we fixed bugs yourself, hired somebody else to fix them, or worked with the communities for the modifications. We thus had many options available, and in most cases we managed to fix the problems at hand. The free access to the code and to the  developers improved the quality of open source originated components within the final product.

On software licensing:

Software licensing is often a complicated and time consuming process. It requires a lot of negotiations between the licenser and the licensee. Based on our experience, an average in-licensing process for a software component takes 6 – 12 months. It is only then when you know if you can really use the component in your project or whether you need to find other solutions.

Licensing is simpler with open source. The licensor has already done the most of the due diligence work in advance. In most cases, the licensor keeps the copyright, doesn’t give any exclusivity, and gives the licenser full right to use the component any way needed. At the financial side, licenser has decided that the code is free, but the licenser may offer support or engineering services for money. Nothing prevents the licensor to go elsewhere for help, if so needed.

All the source code is available for the licensor to study and evaluate. The licensor can assess the community, companies, and available hackers supporting the technology in question. Also, the licensor can talk to others without worrying about trade secrets.

Open source simplifies and accelerates software licensing, and reduces  technology and quality risks. Instead of negotiation for months, the technical work can start immediately.

On confidentiality and the open source community: 

We worked intensively with communities already before we announced the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. Open source approach requires openness and information sharing during development. A high publicity launch, on the other hand, is the way to introduce consumer products to the public and you do not want to reveal the products before the launch date. There is thus a potential conflict between the open source openness and product launch secrecy.

The credentials, work, and history of open source hackers are open for everybody to see. The hackers typically want to work with interesting things also in the future. Therefore, they don’t want to become famous for jeopardizing somebody else’s project and misusing their trust. Thus, openness and open source can actually be much stronger bond than any NDA or monetary sanction one can put on an individual or a company.

Based on our experiences, we can combine open communication and product confidentiality. We had no information leakage prior to the commercial product announcements, although we had had tens of developers working on the software with us. For some of the developers, we had told very detailed information about the forthcoming product. Developing products in open source and yet maintain the confidentiality of the product plans and roadmaps was possible for us.

He further outlines some of the challenges of working in communities, managing the licenses, and where new costs showed up in the project, but summarizes:

Our experiences demonstrate that open source technologies and development model suit very well for such devices. We created the product in shorter time and with lesser resources that we have managed to develop other products utilizing proprietary software. In essence, open source offers time and cost savings in a form of readily available components and subsystems, available developers, and effective development model.

The one interesting thing he doesn't mention: the lack of royalties paid to a Microsoft or Symbian, but then this is a paper about open source software.  As the Asian markets open up, a billion handsets in China won't translate into a billion royalty payments for the OS vendors.  When that amount of money is at stake, experiments like this one are critical to getting the open source engineering model right to save Nokia billions of dollars long term. 

I've thought the Nokia 770 was cool since Mikko handed me his to explore.  The slides to Ari's original presentation on the N770 development are here.  Ari's paper is a fabulous contribution describing how a large company can engage in open source communities.  Ari maintains a blog that is also well worth tracking.

Enjoy!

Innovation at Nokia: Thinking ahead with the Nokia 770

Mikko lent me his Nokia 770 Internet Tablet and I've started to explore the device.  Unfortunately we were in Beijing at the time, so I was missing the documentation and a cable, but that's only encouraged me to start to explore the related websites.  I discovered some of the applications work browsing from the tablet itself.  I found and loaded Gizmo, a VoIP client. I registered Gizmo and sitting at home on the home wifi network "dialed" the house ... and the phone rang.    

And then it hit me.  What if I'm holding the future in my hand?  The Nokia 770 is clearly Not-A-Mobile-Phone, but ....

• We're rapidly approaching a world of city-wide wifi networks and WiMax, and that assumes you don't already move through a mesh of wifi networks (paid and free) in your daily life.  While the mobile cell phone is the technology interface of choice in developing economies today, it's already changing in the developed economies and urban centers.
• The news around the announcement of Apple's coming iPhone pointed out that all the handset manufacturers were probably excited because they may finally be able to break the tyranny of the network mobile operators (NMO) once Apple demonstrates people will pay for device appeal.  But what if we didn't care about the NMO anymore?
• It's a Linux device.  So Nokia has already dodged the bullet of per device royalties from Symbian and/or Microsoft.  (Symbian and Microsoft still think they'll make money with "smart phones" in China.  They're both doing the wrong arithmetic.)
• It's Wifi.  So specific national and regional comms stack requirements from the government via the NMO, supported through the device OS vendor, are also gone. (Really ... what if we didn't care about the NMO anymore?)
• Screen real estate is awesome compared to any cell phone or Blackberry I've seen.  I can read email and PDFs here.  I can browse the web here.  The work Google did for the Gmail mobile browser is hugely helpful when I'm stuck with ONLY my phone, but reading "full" Gmail on the Nokia 770 screen is much much much better than my Motorola Razr.  (Just need to figure out how to turn javascript on.) 
• I can't imagine why anyone wants to read Word docs through a 5cm by 4cm viewer on a mobile phone, but here I can imagine a simplified ODF viewer.  Or Google docs.  (I must find that javascript enablement on the browser.)
• Input methods easily span the stylus, handwriting recognition, and a finger appropriate touch pad.  I'm still becoming proficient in all three, but I also think I like all three in different application settings. 
• Google's laying down city wide wifi.  Forget the Google phone, Google should be pounding down Nokia's door to work on the Nokia tablet series together.  At the very least, Google's apps teams should show up en masse in the maemo community. 

Nokia has even gone out of its way to attract developers.  They've published the platform as open source.  Aside from the Linux platform base, they're building out an applications development community as well.  While the home page is stark, and I've barely begun to scratch the surface, there's a wealth of material here.  I knew Nokia was already experimenting with open source software communities around MUPE.  Here they're raising the bar. 

I do not begrudge Apple from locking out app developers initially from the iPhone, because their internal cult-of-customer-design makes me a happy customer on my PowerBook, iPod, etc.  But they're still thinking about how to turn a small computer with great screen appeal into a phone, and managing the entire customer experience.  Nokia is being brilliant and throwing open the doors on a tablet device that isn't a mobile phone.  But from which I can make calls ....

www.flickr.com

And then I started thinking again ....

Apple and Microsoft are gearing up for the Living Room Wars as the ultimate media experience.  They're each staking turf as the real "set top box" which we've heard promised for a decade.  They're each approaching it as a PC company -- so the set top box must be a PC.  They're each doing business with the music labels and Hollywood, so they think like media channel partners.  I trust Apple to get the user experience "right".  (Windows OS security pop-ups during movies notwithstanding, the Mac media UI is just easier.) 

But Nokia core competencies don't just involve small hand held devices.  They do have some experience in "bigger" equipment.  What if the home network hub was a device near the front door on which I drop my keys, [ultra small and cheap] mobile phone [which is just a camera/phone], and tablet at the end of the day and it:

• syncs the phone and tablet (if indeed they don't actively live in sync via bluetooth),
• syncs the phone and tablet contacts,
• checks for tablet email and routes it appropriately (possibly uploading and sending the tablet off-line outbox),
• syncs any documents I updated,
• uploads the next TiVo episode for watching on tomorrow's commute [or at lunch] because I really don't need yet another US$400-$800 dollar device in my living room,
• ... <what would YOU like it to do> ...

Oh, and inductive charges the two active devices. 

This is actually a second game changing innovation opportunity they could develop, beyond the idea that "the mobile phone company" is developing mobile devices that make mobile phones irrelevant.    Let Microsoft and Apple hammer away at each other over media centers, phones, and hand-held media players. 

Now I just need to figure out how to get the Nokia 770 to talk to my Mac to get some real file sharing going on.  Then I'll think about my killer app ....