06 October 2008

InitMarketing TV Launch with Bruce Perens Video

The first videos are up on InitMarketing.tv. Sandro interviews Bruce Perens in the kick-off video with fun commentary on open source software and the long-tail. There are also interviews with Oliver Nachtrab from Open-Xchange and Florian Effenberger from OpenOffice.org. There's an RSS feed for the site, and Sandro has interviews in the pipeline with Andrew Rodaway (Director of Marketing, Canonical), Fabrizio Capobianco (CEO, Funambol), Shane Martin Coughlan (FTF Coordinator, Free Software Foundation Europe), Stormy Peters (Executive Director, Gnome Foundation), Boris Kraft (CTO, Magnolia), and more. Enjoy!

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01 October 2008

Building an Effective Commercial Open Source Strategy

Initmarketing partners Sandro Groganz and Roberto Galoppini taught a day long workshop entitled "Building an Effective Commercial Open Source Strategy" in Berlin at the Open Source in Mobile conference. I was unfortunately unable to attend (and I love Berlin), but I contributed to the materials. It is essentially our combined experience and expertise wrapped up into a one day how-to seminar.

Roberto has posted a great summary of his presentation on his blog.

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13 February 2008

Would you do Open Source Marketing for Microsoft?

[Updated 2008-02-14, 20:15] Sandro also posted on the subject.

Microsoft’s partners team through its NXT initiative launched a campaign focused on open source ISVs in 2007 in conjunction with the Open Source Business Conference.  The campaign is designed to encourage ISVs to explore how best to deliver their solutions to customers in the Microsoft world, recognizing that many high profile open source projects have 30%-50% of their installed base in the Windows world.   The Microsoft program works through partners to assist ISVs.  

In the open source campaign, the NXT partner works with the ISV to:

  • Review the ISV’s business model, solution offering, and channel delivery plans.
  • Determine the best approach and plan to expand business in the Windows marketplace. 
  • Map Microsoft partner programs that best serve the ISV to their needs.

Microsoft wants to expand the program this year, and Sandro Groganz and I are considering working together to join the program as a partner through his company.  

Sandro set up InitMarketing as a consultancy that develops marketing strategy for companies that use open source software in their solutions to customers.  Sandro’s executive experience at eZ Systems and Mindquarry and as a PHP developer serve him well here.  I’ve done strategy work for and with a number of open source related companies, built a product that used a breadth of open source software covered by a variety of licenses, and spent five years at Microsoft so have some understanding of the organization and its culture.   

As Sandro and I investigate the program, we are not without our misgivings.  Do a search for “open source” on the main Microsoft partner site and you discover mostly anti-open source competitive material in the initial search results.  Do the same search on the NXT partner site and you see a set of open source friendly case studies. (I’ve blogged elsewhere about the Microsoft message conflict problems.) And non-IE browsers don’t always render the site well.  And some parts of the partner world want you to install Silverlight “[i]n order to view the rich media content on this page ....”  None of this is encouraging to the average ISV living in an open source world.  

But this is also our opportunity.  The Microsoft programs were developed out of a culture of “open source equals Linux” and anti-Linux competitive work and sometimes reflect that history.  The NXT program is working to recognize the economic reality of the wealth of free and open source software running in the Windows world today.  We have an opportunity to open the discussion with the ISV team about what open source software actually means on the platform.  We have the opportunity to inform the business to mutual benefit.  

Sandro and I believe that we can start a more transparent discussion with Microsoft’s ISV team, starting here and now.  We’re excited at that opportunity. The ISV and open source teams at Microsoft are open to this discussion. We’re curious what the rest of our readers in our business community think.  Please share your thoughts below.  


04 February 2008

Microsoft Partnerships, Open Source Software ISVs, and Culture and History

Last week, Mary Jo Foley offered commentary on Microsoft's open source software strategy with respect to independent software vendors based on an interview with Microsoft's Sam Ramji. Matt Asay provides good colour commentary on his blog. Each post focuses on the trustworthiness and competitive history of the company. Let's look at things from a different perspective.

First, if you sell software solutions, and one of the platforms you support is Windows, you're not alone. There is a lot of free and open source software that has company support that is deployed on Windows as one of its platforms. The "big" free and open source software names include:

  • JBoss: Claimed 50% deployment on Windows when they signed a partnership deal with Microsoft that included technical collaboration in September 2005.
  • SugarCRM: Claimed 35% deployment on Windows when they signed their technical collaboration deal with Microsoft in February 2006.
  • Eclipse: Several studies have been done over the past few years show Windows adoption for development and deployment (Dev/Dep):
    (80%/60%) [Evans Data Corp., September 2006]
    (62%/37%) [Evans Data Corp., September 2007]
    (74%/47%) [IDC, Summer 2007]
    While Eclipse itself isn't a company, many ISVs build businesses around the Eclipse project.
  • Alfresco: Claims 30% deployment on Windows according to their internal study published June 2007.
  • MySQL: Claims 40% download MySQL for Windows.
  • If Windows is one of the platforms you support, there should be nothing stopping you from considering joining a Microsoft ISV partner program. They provide lots of material and information to make it easier to develop, market, and sell on Windows than doing it all on your own. It absolutely benefits their growth. It benefits yours as well.

    To provide the best possible experience for your customers, if the Windows version of your applications needs to use Active Directory, Microsoft Operations Manager, or any other Microsoft specific technology, then I'm going to assume you'll best serve your customers and architect the application accordingly for multi-platform development, deployment and support. We have been architecting applications to support multiple platforms for decades, and it's easier today with common tools and languages (most of them open source), and standards support across platforms. Again, better to join a Microsoft ISV program and cheaply get access to the best technical information possible for the platform to support your customers.

    Some consider "doing business with Microsoft" tainted. There is no excuse for the behaviour we all saw from Microsoft with Netscape, or Sun with Java. If not for the high profile of the last U.S. Department of Justice investigation, the preponderance of email, and the ease with which one can search it, we wouldn't have such wonderfully embarrassing email examples that demonstrate how some people inside Microsoft think. (It makes you wonder what embarrassing gems are sitting in the email queues of other companies that haven't had this level of public legal scrutiny.) But most companies aren't in a position to demand their customers shift platforms. Even MySQL AB supported the SCO Openserver platform better to support customers.

    [Contrary to popular belief, Microsoft didn't eat all its original ISV chain out of a rapacious need for growth. Customers demanded Microsoft provide a lot of tool support directly to simplify their development and procurement needs as the platform became ubiquitous.]

    There are several things to understand about partnering with Microsoft that have a lot to do with the history and culture of the company. Microsoft was the PC software company, i.e. Microsoft customers had enormous deployments of small footprint inexpensive machines, versus the big server company (1990s) with far fewer big-iron multi-processor machines, versus the mini-computer company (1980s) with fewer less powerful systems, versus the mainframe company (1970s) with fewer still very large machines. While today a company will rack out thousands of blade servers in their back-room big-iron environment, in the 1980s and 1990s they didn't.

    Microsoft developed programs throughout their channel sales and marketing organizations to enable them to scale their growth. Their margins were completely different from the other large software companies (e.g. SAP, Oracle) or UNIX OEMs. So a VMS or UNIX ISV may have seen OEM staff arrive on site to help migrate or tune an application to the platform because of the margins involved in that business, but Microsoft had to create a program to enable their DOS then early Windows ISVs to get access to expertise differently. Starting an ISV that developed PC-related software required a far smaller capital outlay and so there were a lot of such companies. Programs like MSDN were created. The ISV programs were by definition information-intense but engagement-soft. It was the smartest way to correctly serve both their ISV partners and their business model.

    Hardware, software, and the Internet evolved. Windows became Windows NT has become Windows Vista and Server growing into the data centre. The big iron UNIX server world is evolving into scaled arrays of Linux servers. While these worlds collide in the data centre, the financial success of Microsoft remains tied to a culture of scaled programs. If you're an ISV that is used to the way IBM, Sun, or HP treat you, you may be surprised by a Microsoft program's lack of personal engagement.

    There's another cultural practice that contributed to Microsoft's growth and success through the 1990s and that effects partner programs (and customers alike). Employees were allowed, indeed encouraged, to regularly shift positions within the company. In the early days it kept smart people that might be prone to boredom fresh and ensured culture wasn't lost through the employee leaving the company. That practice is still considered a strength today. Scale-out programs (not tied to specific people or relationships) supported this model.

    But it means that any relationships built with the Microsoft by an ISV will likely change regularly. You're going to need patience and regular contact to follow-up with the program people you do meet, and [hopefully] get quick early warning when that person is about to change. You're also going to need determination to be the squeaky persistent wheel. You may be one US$10M/year company clamouring for attention from a Microsoft employee drowning on 150+ emails a day who is responsible for a program with 100 companies like you. Managing the relationship to continue to get attention requires perseverance. If you can grow your business better through a technical partnership similar to the Zend PHP relationship, you will need to be prepared for a very focused meeting because you'll likely get one shot to get the point across. (Hint: Start with the punchline then keep things short and direct.)

    In the end, do what makes sense for your customers. Join the Microsoft ISV program if it makes business sense. Use the materials that help your business grow and ignore the rest. Do it with your eyes wide open and your expectations set. Best of luck!


    24 January 2008

    Open Source Business Practices and Conversion Rate Myths

    With the Sun Microsystem recent move to acquire MySQL AB, open source business models will be a topic of much discussion again. MySQL AB, like Red Hat, has always been one of the examples everyone points to for how an open source business should be run. One of the oft quoted statistics of the MySQL business is "one customer for every thousand users". This number is then quickly put into context as "probably too big" because MySQL is available in so many places that trying to count downloads and users becomes impossible. When JBoss was acquired by Red Hat, the publicly acknowledged conversion rates were 3% (JBoss) and 10% (Red Hat). People start making assumptions about business models based on driving downloads and user community size. And that's where the problem starts.

    That's an order of magnitude difference. In a bricks-and-mortar world, business differences measured in a few percentage points are spectacular when comparing company ratios. In a digital world, where the cost of goods sold and marginal cost differences change, it doesn't seem right that we would be seeing orders of magnitude differences between companies for this type of ratio.

    I participated in a recent informal (qualitative) survey around purchased support for Linux systems. [It was definitely NOT quantitatively or statistically significant. But anecdotal evidence can be interesting.] In operations of 100 servers or fewer, no one even considered buying support from their vendor for ANY of the servers. In operations of greater than 1000 servers, no one questioned buying support for ALL of their servers. Even "small" operations of 100 servers were still mission critical.

    Somewhere in the order of magnitude difference in the server farm size, buying priorities change IT budget allocations. Maybe it has something to do with relative percentages of the budget spent on hardware/software/support versus headcount/expertise. Or with the cost of downtime to the business for a particular application environment. (A friend with a "small" server farm of ~100 servers told me recently they didn't hesitate to pay for JBoss support while migrating a critical application from a BEA Weblogic environment, but didn't consider paying support on the Linux servers themselves.) Or maybe it has something to do with the relative margins of the business. But I'm pretty sure the change in buying habit has more to do with the customers' business needs than the vendors' distribution practices.

    Regular readers of this blog have heard me rail against the idea that open source is some sort of different business model. (Again, I'm not talking about collaborative software development in community here, but rather businesses that use such software.) It's definitely an area we need to go think about some more, figuring which software business ratios are significant and which practices to encourage.


    17 January 2008

    MySQL and Sun

    Dolphin Zen

    Sun Microsystems wants to acquire MySQL AB for US$1Billion. Stephen O'Grady (Redmonk) posted his always excellent deal analysis on his blog. I would urge you to have a read. (It also is a great collection of the relevant URLs.) I'll fit a few extra observations around it. Jonathan's blog post sets the tone for Sun, while Zack's post sets the MySQL perspective straight. But first, congratulations to Monty Widenius and David Axmark for their original vision, and to Mårten Mickos, Zack Urlocker, and Brian Aker and the rest of the team that has built so much value into MySQL AB. Congratulations also to Sun for having the vision to acquire MySQL.

    Christensen is the first to point out in his presentations that what he originally called “disruptive technology” in The Innovator’s Dilemma was later observed to be a “disruptive business model” by Andy Grove during a presentation at Intel. (The book had already gone to print, and so we now have loads of technology companies running around thinking their technology is more important than their business models.)

    Christensen models demonstrate that a disruptive business model generally begins with an inexpensive “inferior” technology offered at a lower price in a different margin business model that enables customers either to do something they’ve never been able to do or to avoid the expensive control point. The “inferior” technology matures as the business grows and eventually the business grows into mature markets (i.e. the business model is disruptive). Think Linux from undergraduate project in 1991 to the IBM and Red Hat/MSDW Wall Street keynotes at LinuxWorld in 2002. So too with MySQL.

    Oracle hammered away at the message that MySQL was missing key features high-end relational databases needed to support mission critical applications. But MySQL is the Web’s database. It was created with a different vision and goal in mind, and enabled an entirely new group of customers to make it the “M” in LAMP. It is gaining the features needed to eventually allow it to be an Oracle replacement, but that isn’t the goal today, nor has it been the business model. This means that any way Oracle executives try to measure the database (transactions, scale out, etc.) or the company (units, revenue, etc.) will leave them scratching their heads. To Oracle’s credit, they quickly understood that it isn’t that MySQL is free or open source software that’s their [future] problem but the business models around it that are disquieting, and so adjust their rhetoric accordingly.

    I raised questions about cultural mixing when Red Hat acquired JBoss, but I think it is less critical this time or rather my questions about the processes and values with respect to customers will be less of an issue. MySQL should be a separate enough line of business for the foreseeable future.

    I think Stephen’s analysis from the Sun angle is perfect. Sun continues to evolve its solution to customers to enable it to be the heart of the Web. Owning a word in the customer’s mind is the pinnacle of marketing excellence. But complex network computing solutions aren’t quite as simple as “Kleenex”, “Xerox” or “Escalator”.

    IBM evolved to be a company that offered their customers all the technology choice AND the expertise to knit it together into a coherent unique customized solution. It doesn’t matter how imperfectly true that statement may or may not be -- but rather what customers perceive it to be. That doesn’t mean IBM isn’t happy to push an IBM-centric technology agenda, but it’s the customer relationship that’s important (since they’re the people with the money and the choice) and IBM focuses on ensuring they have the breadth of product offering to best map their customers’ self-selected heterogeneous needs. They are no longer the “Selectric” company and have even evolved with the networked IT world to be more than the “mainframe” company. IBM continues to build their message around open systems, standards, and open source, which suits their customer’s heterogeneous decisions. IBM is the “data center” company.

    Sun is also evolving its message and its offerings to suit their customers heterogeneous web-based applications needs. They’re building relationships with IBM, Microsoft, the Linux community, and now they’re acquiring MySQL. Sun is in a position to deliver a heterogeneous technology base to their customers’ heterogeneous needs and to shape a marketing message that began as technology slogans around “the network is the computer” and “the dot in Dot Com” into a customer centric idea like the “Web” company. That doesn’t mean they won’t meet severe competition from IBM for which idea word is more important in customers’ minds, but they’re still in the game after being counted out too many times in the past.

    Mårten and Jonathan


    18 September 2007

    (Mis-)Reporting Microsoft and the EU

    PR is a wonderful thing.  The PR surrounding the EU decision on Microsoft begins with Microsoft gracefully accepting the court's ruling in a press release.

    Well said!  Indeed, masterfully said.  Humble.  Conciliatory.  Quick to point out how the industry has changed.  Quick to point out the expanded investment in Europe.  Now let's look at the positioning.

    The PR machine actually started the day before the announcement in the Financial Times ("Microsoft says rivals may rue siding with EU") with:

    "Obviously, law that is made for Microsoft is going to apply to other market leaders as well. IBM, Google, Apple and others would have to look very carefully at the implications for their business models," — Brad Smith, Microsoft General Counsel

    The New York Times started the week with "European Court Rejects Microsoft Antitrust Appeal".  The best quote:

    “What this ruling will do is send a message to companies that if they establish a good market position with a successful product, they will be forced in Europe to essentially give up that product to their competitors.”  — Robert Kramer, a vice president of public policy for CompTIA, [a Microsoft ally]

    The venerable Wall Street Journal further raises the spectre of anti-American sentiment under the banner "Microsoft Loss In Europe Raises American Fears", and picks up on the innovation thread with:

    Microsoft's backers said the ruling will stifle innovation by making it tougher to design products with new features.

    What utter PR-induced rubbish.  What is at question is NOT whether Microsoft is simply in a market leading position, or how they were shipping innovative features, but rather whether they abused a market dominant position with anti-competitive practices.  Here's how the EU actually describes a market dominant position in Article 82:

    A dominant position is a situation of economic power held by a firm which allows it to hinder effective competition in the relevant market. It puts the firm in a position to exert considerable influence on the conditions in which competition is to develop, and to act without having to take that into account. ["Relevant Market" is defined here.]

    One of the things that Article 82 goes on to discuss is "making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject matter of such contracts."  This would be something that U.S. Department of Justice followers might remember from the discussion around Microsoft OEM deals and bundling.  So the EU and the DoJ may not be as far apart as Thomas Barnett (U.S. DoJ) is quoted in the WSJ article.

    Andy Updegrove's analysis is probably closer to reality.  Microsoft got off lightly here.  Just as US$100M in inbound litigation a year is the cost of doing business as a US$50B company, so to is this judgement.

    While today's judgment is significant, it is worth noting that the penalties that Microsoft has incurred to date – roughly $1 billion, plus an obligation to reimburse a far smaller amount of legal fees – are minute in comparison to the magnitude of the profits it has garnered over the ten-year investigative period. During that time, its market share in both of the subject markets has grown dramatically. As a result, while Microsoft has nominally lost in court, it continues to win at the bottom line, given that the only impact on its products to date has been  more symbolic than effectual - the requirement to offer a version of Windows that does not bundle a free copy of its media player.

    Stated another way, a billion dollars spread over ten years is $100 million a year.  During the same period, Microsoft revenues have grown enormously, to over $50 billion a year, fueled primarily by the continuing growth of its operating system and Office products.  It has been a tiny cost of business to pay, and a shrewd and cynical business decision to incur, a liability to pay one fifth of one percent of annual gross revenues to retain the freedom to dominate so lucrative a market in spite of the 2004 judgment.

    It sort of puts all Mr. Smith's encouraging and friendly quotes about the growth of the Microsoft business over the past ten years in Europe into perspective.


    11 September 2007

    IBM Joins OpenOffice.org (The Quick Analysis)

    A94FBCE7-3E57-44FA-8D17-3BC8F0B08770.jpg

    It's official — IBM has joined the OpenOffice.org project. [There's good reporting and analysis from Andy Updegrove and Redmonk's Stephen O'GradyUpdate (12 Sep): Here's Andy's interview with IBM's Doug Heintzman, Director of Strategy for the Lotus division.] 

    Here's the back of the envelop analysis.

    From the OpenOffice.org community perspective, I'm guessing Louis Suarez-Potts (OO.o Community Manager) is feeling good to get a new injection of code/energy.  This is great for the community.  The OpenOffice suite keeps getting better and better, but new blood with new code could provide a much needed boost.

    Overall Sun Microsystems is probably [very] happy IBM is supporting OpenOffice.org directly.  This is a much better situation than IBM building some form of ODF development platform inside Eclipse.org to enable ODF over OOXML, with OpenOffice.org hit as collateral damage.  [This would be sort of ironic since Eclipse helped to pull the Java centre-of-gravity away from Sun, and Visual Studio was collateral damage (or icing depending upon one's perspective).]  Collaboration is the much stronger market play here for Sun and IBM, and most importantly OO.o users and customers.

    From the IBM perspective, this is brilliant business as usual.  ODF is the global leverage they need to crack open the Microsoft Office marketplace.  (I've written ad nauseam that ODF and Microsoft Office is just another example of Christensen economics in motion.  Microsoft has over-delivered on Office.  They mistakenly think more innovation faster is the answer.  Let the chips fall where they may.)  IBM will likely use OpenOffice to front-end Lotus and the Domino server product lines, and anchor their business messages to their customers's needs around standards and open source software, much the same as they do with Eclipse and the Websphere developer world.  Their claims are that much stronger with this announcement.

    Sun gave Gnome a huge leg up about four years ago when they contributed a wealth of their accessibility technology R+D.  IBM will now contribute the same into OpenOffice.org.  It means they can easily manage their way through U.S. government procurement regulation in this space.  Once again brilliant IP management from IBM, and good for OO.o users and customers.  [For those that have heard me present, this is exactly what I mean about having a mature intellectual asset strategy, and being generous exactly in order to play to win.]

    A strengthened OpenOffice.org will help Novell immeasurably to keep their distance with Microsoft on the desktop.  Novell has done a lot of work with OO.o in the past.  They have a great desktop Linux product.  They can simply take a ride on this one and eat the benefits.  There's really nothing Microsoft can say here.  Regardless of any agreements around OOXML that Novell may have with Microsoft, Novell comes out clean on the ODF front as customers demand it.

    I noticed the press release includes a quote from Beijing's Redflag Chinese 2000 Software Co., Ltd., the makers of Redflag Linux and RedOffice.  This is significant.  Apparently last November I was one of the first people to blog about the document format work in China that led to a Chinese national standard (UOF).  Redflag Chinese 2000 was implementing UOF in Red Office (the Chinese packaging of OO.o).  There is work afoot to harmonize ODF and UOF.  And clearly Redflag Chinese 2000 remains committed to the OO.o effort.

    So despite the bluff and bluster, the OOXML camp inside Microsoft should not be sleeping well at this point. 

    "Don't blink.  Blink and you're dead.  Don't turn your back.  Don't look away.  And don't blink.  Good luck!"the Doctor


    07 June 2007

    Microsoft Advertising Windows Embedded on Google

    I googled "microsoft xandros".
    While I typically don't notice ads, I happened to notice the first sponsored link on the right side of the page:      

    Linux Download
    Customize your Operating System.
    Learn more about Windows Embedded.
    www.Microsoft.com

    You end up on the Microsoft Windows Embedded page. 
    The word "linux" appears nowhere on the page. 
    Sort of wrong and funny all at the same time on multiple levels.


    01 June 2007

    Microsoft Messaging on Patents and Open Source Software

    Sam Ramji, Bryan Kirschner, Michael Francisco (and briefly Bill Hilf) from the Microsoft open source software lab were front and center last week at the Open Source Business Conference (OSBC), largely because of an article published the previous week in Fortune.  There were several discussions that centered around patents and software business from an open source perspective, and I realized there are several disconnects between the Microsoft legal team and their PR machine, and most of the rest of the world. 

    The first disconnect appeared during Microsoft's day long event for open source ISVs the day before OSBC.  Microsoft represents a US$44B revenue stream.  Most of the executives from software businesses in the event represent companies that run US$2M to US$20M.  There is a world of difference between the way these companies need to behave with respect to intellectual property tools and their software assets. 

    Most small companies don't care about patents in the same way as a large company must.  A small company will likely file for a patent or three because it can make a real difference in their valuation in both funding and M&A activity.  The management team, however,  applies a different calculus to the problem.  Filing for three patents with good patent attorneys could cost ~US$50K.  That's half a head count for a year.  And the patents won't be approved faster than 24-36 months.

    Was the small company to discover a large company infringing their claims, they have very few real options.  They have a ticket to a negotiation implied in their ownership of the patent.  They can't afford to be greedy in the discussion because they can't afford the legal costs of a prolonged legal debate if business negotiations fail. Patent "cross licensing" deals with large companies with thousands of patents are not exactly balanced for small companies.

    Most companies just don't live in the space of large cross licensing deals like a Sun, Microsoft, IBM, Intel, etc.  That doesn't mean the smaller company management teams don't respect intellectual property or don't care about it, they just value patents differently in their business model.  I imagine the average $20M company executive would happily entertain the painful and frustrating headache of $100M/year of inbound litigation with which Microsoft lives, if it came with a $44B revenue stream. 

    These executives don't want "special" rules for intellectual property.  But neither do they need to think and apply the same rules the same way as companies that are Three Orders of Magnitude bigger.  Indeed, for most of these executives, trademark (i.e. brand management) and copyright management is everything to them, and they're very savvy with respect to copyright licensing. 

    The second disconnect is the Microsoft talking point about return on investment for the R&D expense.  Microsoft rightly claims on the order of $7B spent each year on research and development.  The PR talking point is that "they want a return on that investment."  The rest of us see a $44B revenue stream and think, "and what part of that revenue stream shouldn't be considered ROI?"  This is what happens when you let lawyers (cost side of the balance sheet) think they can be a profit center. 

    This brings us to the third disconnect.  The Microsoft executive and legal teams look to the IBM claims of $2B-$4B/year in IP licensing revenues and thinks, "why not us?"  Why not indeed.  Well let's look at some of the differences.  You see it's really a business marketing problem. 

    Microsoft historically has a culture of putting programs in place so as to scale efficiently and keep margins high.  This is good business practice.   So the legal team did as well: here's the "IP Licensing" home.  [I think it's significant that the URL contains a segment named "about".  Remember --  legal is a cost center.  Most of the legal concerns that reach the public eye would rightly show up under "about" on most company web sites.]  As you explore this part of the site, you'll find all goodness about why you should license Microsoft IP through their licensing programs 'cause they're smart guys that invest a lot in R&D.  (And they are and they do.)

    But it's different than the business model practices developed over the long haul by IBM.  Go look at the model Microsoft is chasing: here's the IBM IP licensing page.  The page starts with the statement that they're the market leader in awarded patents (regardless of R&D investment), and they're "expanding their use of intellectual property to accelerate the adoption of open standards and open source software through creative licensing and stewardship programs."  There's a prominent link on the simple page to all the program work in which IBM invests to modernize and reform the patent system and "reinvent the invention system."  It is a remarkable piece of positioning. 

    Here is the company that clubbed Microsoft like a baby seal in the early cross licensing days, essentially playing the reformist hero.  It is masterful marketing. IBM thinks through the business strategy from all angles (including support for open source software), then tells a GREAT story about it.  [Indeed, an IBM executive would have wept for laughing so hard if they'd been present for the vaguely unprofessional bashing Sam Ramji took at the 451 Group reception at OSBC from a panel made up of Dan Kohn (Linux Foundation), Jeremy Allison (Google ex-Novell), and Eben Moglen. Andy Updegrove was the only balanced voice on the panel.  Sam had to stand in the audience with the rest of us plebes and wait his turn for the mic.]

    It's not that Microsoft doesn't want reform in the patent system, they simply don't talk about the work they do sponsor.  And when they try to message reform it fails.  They come across complaining about the inbound $100M/year litigation costs, with the additional hammering they've taken by Eolas (~$500M) and the Sun license (another $2B).  They try to say they too want reform because they're victims too!  But it's a poor story up against the $44B revenue stream.   It has all the negative impact of Paris Hilton fretting about her approaching jail time while shopping for ten thousand dollar handbags.  (I wonder how much inbound litigation IBM takes a year?)

    What they need is a leadership message.  One that resonates with a clean position with which the rest of us mere mortals can sympathize and possibly even support.  Daniel Chalef (CEO, Knowledge Tree) offered the start of one for them during the ISV day but it was likely lost and not recognized for the brilliance it represents.  Daniel suggested Microsoft take a leadership position in the EU AGAINST software patents

    This is fabulous.  It could even be cleanly messaged as "encouraging the EU to not follow in the footsteps of the U.S. until such time as patent reforms have been implemented and proved."  They would not be saying no software patents, but rather encouraging the EU to not make the same mistake the U.S. made until the U.S. figures out how to clean up the mess we all agree exists.  It would show leadership, align with their current positioning, and not sound like victimized whining, nor would it clash with their licensing programs.   

    IBM is leading the reform movement and winning friends with its messaging while happily licensing and defending its intellectual property.  It comes at a cost and maybe the margins aren't as good as Microsoft's historical packaged software margins, but business it is.  Sun has reinvented its executive messaging cleanly to say they've got to play the game as a large business in the U.S., and they'll only use the portfolio defensively.

    It's time for Microsoft to do the same before they're again [possibly mis]quoted as making veiled threats against customers.   Microsoft is a software company.  It's about time they again acted as one and stopped pushing their IP licensing business to the forefront of their messaging.  It's not (nor will it ever be as big as) the business we (their customers) know they're in so it only serves as too frustrating a distraction.