Once More unto the Breach

Building an Effective Commercial Open Source Strategy

Initmarketing partners Sandro Groganz and Roberto Galoppini taught a day long workshop entitled "Building an Effective Commercial Open Source Strategy" in Berlin at the Open Source in Mobile conference. I was unfortunately unable to attend (and I love Berlin), but I contributed to the materials. It is essentially our combined experience and expertise wrapped up into a one day how-to seminar.

Roberto has posted a great summary of his presentation on his blog.

Nokia and the Symbian Foundation Opportunity - Part II

The previous post looked at the Nokia acquisition of Symbian from the competitive perspective. Let's now look at the opportunities and challenges for Nokia and the new Symbian Foundation. Remember that assuming successful regulatory approval, there will be no Symbian Ltd. anymore. Nokia will need to manage the challenges that come with any acquisition. When you buy a company, you essentially acquire the assets (in this case the software), the intellectual capital of the employees, and the customers.

This acquisition is particularly interesting as key Symbian Ltd. shareholders and customers have banded together to deliver the primary software assets into a not-for-profit organization. There's a great white paper outlining the initial strategy on the currently minimalist Symbian Foundation site.

Essentially:

• Nokia will acquire the remaining shares of Symbian Ltd. that it doesn't already own.
• Symbian Ltd. employees become Nokia employees.
• Fujitsu, Motorola, Nokia, NTT DOCOMO, and Sony Ericsson (all Symbian Foundation board members with the exception of Fujitsu) will contribute SymbianOS, S60, UIQ, MOAP and related software and documentation assets to the newly formed foundation.
• The initial board directors will be AT&T, LG, Motorola, Nokia, NTT DOCOMO, Samsung Electronics, Sony Ericsson, STMicroelectronics, Texas Instruments and Vodafone.
• The foundation launches (expected in early 2009) and all the assets will be available to members under a royalty-free license.
• A new platform will be developed from SymbianOS and S60 with selected components of UIQ and MOAP. The first release of the unified Symbian Foundation platform is expected to be available during 2009. The platform will offer the means to build a complete mobile device while providing the tools to differentiate devices through tailoring of the user experience, applications and services.
• The new platform is to be backwards compatible with SymbianOS v9 and S60 3rd Edition.
• Platform assets will be made available as open source gradually over the next 2 years, with the intent to use the Eclipse Public License (EPL) 1.0, making the platform code available to all for free.

Most of this is fantastic news. The economics of code sharing, value preservation of the intellectual asset, and innovation capture will be delivered through the foundation with the primary stakeholders sharing the costs. This is a perfect example of the economics of shared development in this particular market space and "why open source software."

Organization and governance of the new Foundation will be key. The foundation is open to all and membership will cost US$1500. The primary board members will share all the operational costs. This seems a reasonable way to manage the cost — it's likely much cheaper than historical royalty payments and it scales well versus a fixed premium membership fee structure seen in other places. The white paper describes the functioning of the foundation based on the following structure.

As a side observation, it would behoove Intel to get involved early on, conceivably as a primary board member and share the costs. As the mobile world of phones and laptops converge, they should be investing beyond moblin.org. That is NOT to say that the mobile world will be a single class of devices in the future, but rather the space will overlap for some time and I would think Intel would want to participate as widely as possible.

So where are the edges that need to be carefully considered in the new Symbian Foundation?

• While the foundation is open to all, and the list of membership benefits is well defined today (in the white paper), one of the benefits reads: Right to access and modify foundation source code, and contribute code to the foundation. This needs to be rethought along the lines of how the Eclipse Foundation manages committers and contributors. The Symbian Foundation is deliberately cutting off unknown sources of contribution if they make it a membership benefit. There is no loss of control in encouraging (and vetting) contributions from as wide a population as possible. Putting gates around the community early, or discouraging contributors looks arrogant and risks the community's participation and growth at precisely the time when it is most needed. Microsoft certainly demonstrated how fast you could pour cold water on a community with the Rotor project. Motorola had its early Linux community vanish. Heavy-handed control and "we know best" attitudes hampered the early critical growth of the OpenSolaris community. Who knows what sources of innovation will be cut off (and will defect to other projects) with this gate in place.
• "Backwards compatibility" as an absolute goal. This is not a bad thing per se, but it feels like the backwards compatibility requirement exists to deal with a long delivery cycle — essentially asking developers to begin developing today for the open source platform delivery in two years and the promise that the investment will be protected. All complex dynamic software hits a point in its evolution where a re-write is required. (The Linux kernel rewrote the entire VM and scheduler after about 10 years of evolution with modern architectures.) Backwards compatibility becomes the challenge. But the opportunity forward MUST be bigger than the backwards compatibility option. It needs to be managed in the community, i.e. this is a community issue and a delivery time-line issue. Think of the opportunity that Microsoft took moving from the Windows world of the late nineties to the new world enabled by NT. Think of the enormous opportunity Apple took moving from Mac OS9 to Mac OSX. Think of developing a community of innovation forward like the Mozilla world and Eclipse.
• The whole two-year process feels like a traditional corporate engineering culture trying to manage change around a well established product space. This would be great if this was what Symbian Ltd. was to remain (but even then it risks being a dead-end overtaken by other solutions with the coming mobile Internet wave). When IBM began the Eclipse Project, they put safe IP structures around a software base, some simple governance and a road map in place, and got on with the work. Later, the Eclipse Foundation was created as a better way to manage the inbound innovation and growth under a well defined IP regime. Now, the Eclipse Foundation and Mozilla Corp. provide excellent blueprints for what the Symbian Foundation needs to be. Nokia already has the inhouse experience to build from those blueprints. Engineering cultural change is difficult but essential here. While one wouldn't expect Symbian Ltd. to release its core assets while awaiting regulatory approval, there have to be other complementary software assets internally available that could be released as early experiments to begin to get the IT structure in place and begin the cultural learning. Two years gives Android and LiMo and even Windows Mobile too much time to erode a community that should rightly be coming to the Symbian Foundation.

These are all key issues. Cultural change is hard in any acquisition. In this case it is doubly so for an engineering team used to delivering to a particular set of customer requirements now dropped into an open source world and needing to understand how open source works and customers and users differ, as well as for a business team used to driving platform revenue and profitability that need to consider now driving platform adoption as an end goal unto itself.

The Symbian Foundation is an opportunity not to simply re-invent the mobile phone platform, but to build the most innovative shared platform forward for the coming mobile Internet. Working with peer organizations like the Eclipse and Mozilla foundations, and arguably the Android project, a stable dynamic open source platform can be created that best suits the needs of customers and consumers for some time to come. Nokia's vision and foresight open up amazing possibilities. Here's wishing them speedy success.

Nokia and the Symbian Foundation Opportunity - Part I

Sixty days ago, Nokia announced it was buying the rest of Symbian Corp., and would then open source SymbianOS using the Eclipse Public License through a newly created Symbian Foundation. This is a great announcement. Stephen O'Grady did an excellent Redmonk Q&A analysis at the time. Nat Torkington also had cogent analysis on what it may mean with respect to Android. There was lots of other commentary, however, that wanted to portray this as a last ditch effort against Android, Linux and LiMo, and the coming wave of the iPhone. Let's step back for a moment.

This is a fantastic exit for Symbian. They're celebrating their 10th anniversary at the peak of their game with enormous market share, but there was going to be trouble on the horizon. If you saw the Symbian presentations of a couple of years ago, they all looked to China, India, and the other developing economies and assumed a proportionate claim of market share. But here's the rub — when you start talking a few dollars royalty per handset then royalties quickly fall into the billions of dollars when you consider "handsets for [India | China]". For a billion dollars, I can start thinking about other alternative operating systems and indeed that's what Symbian's primary shareholders began doing.

Motorola delivered the Ming phone into China on a cut-down Linux base. This was almost a year before the iPhone "happened" and for the Chinese market was arguably a much more useful "phone". (Full stylus input for Chinese characters — think about that and texting.) The Ming was the first 2MP pixel camera (with business-card-to-contacts-database software that worked with the camera), a media player, and came in a sleek package. This was likely just the beginning of the shift away from SymbianOS in emerging markets, especially considering there are Chinese companies working on cut-down Linux-for-mobile platforms as well.

The announcement was a great acquisition for Nokia. For on the order of two years of royalty payments to Symbian, they now own the whole asset, regardless of whether they share it. But Nokia too was considering how to best work in the open source community and using Linux as a base for around the N770/N800 series Internet tablets.

Let's look at the competitive landscape for a moment before looking at the enormous opportunity in front of Nokia and the Symbian Foundation.

The "Competitors"
The iPhone isn't competition for SymbianOS. The iPhone, true to Apple's history of profitability over market share and its cult of design and usability, is an amazing consumer experience. The complete Apple experience depends upon controlling the entire technology stack in a tightly integrated fashion. In Christensen economic models, the iPhone is a new class of product and will deliver more value to its customer target over the coming years through tight control and integration than can be delivered through standardized interfaces and components, and Apple will reap the margin benefits. That same focus on function and design also means Apple will never own 65% of the global market — it won't be producing $25 iPhones for Africa anytime soon. What Apple has demonstrated to the mobile industry with the iPhone is what the mobile web experience can be. They may have "only" sold a couple million units in their first year, but they are driving 65% of the web's mobile traffic on iPhones/iTouch devices (stat from Jason Grigsby's excellent OSCON presentation). The iPhone is an innovation example for Symbian, not a competitive threat.

Google's Android is interesting. Google wants to drive application development with Android that uses Google services to find ways to grow their ad revenue as the mobile web comes into its own. They are discovering the difficulties of delivering a handset OS — something around which the Symbian engineering team has a lot of experience. Since Google isn't actually a device company, this feels like an opportunity for each of them to explore their complementary spaces. Google application services running on a Symbian base would seem to be a win for Google and application developers trying to settle on a model while allowing Symbian to do what it does best and focus on developing a strong developer community. Since the Symbian Foundation will not be under a market competitive revenue gun, profit-centric competitive decisions are removed that might have historically put co-operating with Google at risk. Android should be an opportunity, and not a competitive threat.

LiMo was created to provide a common Linux fork for mobile. The mobile handset manufacturers have shared technology through Symbian Inc. for ten years. As the industry changed and the royalty became a problem, they all wrestled with Linux. They need a royalty free OS, but trying to integrate into the Linux community has been a source of frustration for quite some time. Things that are critically important to handset manufacturers aren't necessarily even interesting to the mainstream Linux community. Each handset manufacturer was forced to fork their own. Before Android (a company-centric platform from a non-device company) and before Symbian became open source, LiMo was likely the best opportunity for a shared royalty-free platform. The most damning thing for LiMo pre-Symbian was probably Nokia's proven ability to work in the open source community to develop the N770 without a fork. The Symbian Foundation use of the Eclipse Public License will also likely make handset manufacturers much more comfortable — the EPL IBM-lineage ensured that the hardware patent clause was still intact. So LiMo is not a competitive threat for Symbian, but the reverse is not so true.

Windows Mobile is not interesting. Microsoft has seen mobile computing coming for sometime, but there are several problems. First there's the royalty problem. Second there's the open source culture versus IP protection problem, both internally and from an external partner perspective. Lastly, there's a very subtle cultural problem. In the early days of mainframes and minicomputers, users thought in terms of a data record/transaction metaphor. The PC introduced users to a document metaphor for computing. The mobile phone space uses a communications metaphor. Microsoft thinks of the mobile phone space as a small powerful PC used to read Word documents to drive data revenues for the mobile network operators, and that's not the sort of mindset the handset manufacturers have. (Another startling statistic from Jason Grigsby's excellent OSCON presentation: 2007 SMS revenues were $100B, which is more than the Hollywood box office, DVD sales and rentals, the music industry, and video game sales combined.) So while Windows Mobile was interesting in a pre-Symbian Foundation world, it still only had a quarter of the deployment of SymbianOS, and now Symbian will be royalty free. So Windows Mobile is not a competitive threat for Symbian, but the new Symbian Foundation done right will definitely threaten Windows Mobile.

It was interesting to see almost no discussion over the past couple of months around Ubuntu Mobile Internet Device (MID) Edition or Intel's Mobile Linux project (moblin.org). Each of them are carefully not targeting the mobile phone space but are forward looking to "the mobile internet" using in-vehicle devices and netbooks as their examples. It will be interesting to see how this space evolves as the mobile phone grows up into the space, and the laptop/notebook space shrinks down.

Next we'll look at the opportunity in front of the Symbian Foundation: Nokia and the Symbian Foundation Opportunity - Part II

OSCON 2008: Open Source Software Economics, Standards, and IP in One Lesson

I was fortunate enough to give a talk at OSCON 2008 in Portland. I realized on Tuesday (the day before the talk) that my business tutorial slides that I normally use as a level set when consulting were just NOT going to cut it. Here are the OSCON slides:

Open Source Software Economics, Standards, and IP in One Lesson

view presentation (tags: oscon2008 ip ipr open source)

Developing a Standards Office for Google

I've been thinking about this since I published the Standards Primer a month ago. In the next two to five years, Google will be challenged by a technology standards effort that it will need to encourage or manage in its mission to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful. Such efforts cannot be erected quickly (as demonstrated most recently by Microsoft), and preparations for that day should begin in the near future. Google is also in a unique position to turn the standards development process on its head.

Here are a number of ideas for how Google can plan for the future in the most flexible and cost effective manner, and contribute a unique and valuable re-think of the standards development process. Well organized, a standards function can be an order of magnitude more effective at growing or defending a company’s business.

A Standards Office for Google

There are a set of strategic questions to be answered by a standards function at Google: What standards should be developed or encouraged to reduce the friction of organizing the world’s information and making it universally accessible and useful, or to open up new areas for growth? Is Android a reference implementation? An open source community? Does it require a standard? Are there micro-format standards that would make indexing web sites, libraries, or health records easier? What standards could others be planning that need to be managed because they threaten Google customer engagements or limit growth? Is a search results standard good or bad for business?

Google has a perceived public culture around serving customers, aggressively innovating, doing no evil, and having fun. These attributes should be celebrated equally loudly in their standards function which for most companies is portrayed as staid, conservative and dull.

As with all business functions, success in the standards function is a matter of organization, preparation and execution. To succeed, you need to:

• Have a strategic planning function that knows how best to recommend using the company assets to develop and respond to standards and standards-like programs and communities.
• Be able to find, organize, and educate potential participants and practitioners within Google quickly as the need arises.
• Be in a position to influence external participants and organizations through successive layers of trust, i.e. you need to be participating and be visible.

The following is the start of some considerations for a standards office at Google:

• Organize the standards office to be a small number of standards strategy staff. This group would have the responsibility for education, evaluation, organization and co-ordination, and forward strategy planning.
• Individual technical staff are generally the first group of people an organization discovers in their own ranks participating in standards. They are the first line of trust and influence. They are in the worst position when it comes to IP risk or reward. Standards practitioners often develop out of the initial group of standards participants. These practitioners are people that have an interest in the success of the standards efforts at a more organizational level and begin to see cross-standards influences.
• Educating participants and practitioners is key to ensure they know how to best get things done, protect the company’s investments, and how to keep others within the company informed of status. The standards office should be responsible for developing and delivering the educational materials.
• Organizing and co-ordinating the efforts of participants and practitioners is important if a company is to get the best return on the investment of having them involved. The initial participants are already building trust in their respective organizations. They are the front line and need to be supported in their roles.
• Google has offices in 27 countries. This is an opportunity to build trust with 27 national member bodies in ISO. Some countries have rules about participation (you need to attend so many of the past meetings to be eligible to vote for example). Some countries are more relevant than others, because they hold particular influence as well. But Google is in a great position to begin here.
• The standards team should be responsible for co-ordination with legal and corporate affairs and the business teams (product marketing and development) for standards-related efforts.
• The standards office should also be responsible for monitoring ongoing activities in the standards development world to watch for particular efforts that should be joined or managed.
• The standards office should develop forward thinking strategy in the standards space. Based on current products and future opportunities, what standards efforts might be undertaken at Google at what cost to best enable customers and users?

The investment need not be great. Google is in a great position to begin. But there are even more interesting ideas in the standards arena and Google is in a unique position to fulfill them.

Turning Standards on their Head

Taking a typical Google viewpoint of what could be done with infinite cycles, storage, and bandwidth when thinking about standards opens up new opportunities in the standards engagement space that come back to Google’s mission to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible.

Developing interoperability standards is a labour intensive process. A working group meets to debate and discuss the nuts and bolts of the specification, but that act and its attendant work have lots of friction in the system:

• Meetings need to organize and track input documents, minutes, and output documents that pertain to the development of the specification that will become a standard.
• Specification development is often as complex as developing complex software, where a collection of document sources (text, markup+metadata, diagrams, tables), need to come together into a single known identifiable “printable” document that is easily available, indexed and searchable.
• Draft specifications need to be managed and balloted and the votes and comments from the balloting process need to be tallied, tracked and managed against document drafts.
• Interpretations (bug reports) need to be managed against published standards.
• Amendments need to be managed against the history and evolution of the standard specification.
• Many organizations develop software reference implementations for the specification, and the source code needs to be managed as a software project as well as against the specification (and its drafts).
• Some organizations develop test suites for conformance verification and validation against a standard, and again both the software itself needs to be managed, as well as the link to the specifications.

While different standards organizations exist to fulfill different missions, and so have different structures, policies, and practices, this lack of underlying consistency leads to a diverging base of information rather than a converging one. Regardless of the differing policies and practices of the standards development organizations, the friction in the system is common and causes lots of problems.

• Every working group and organization tackles these problems in their own ways, cobbling together the tools and processes that meet the standards development organization’s (SDO) policies and procedures. It is labour intensive, repetitive, and best practices seldom surface across diverse tools and organizations.
• History and knowledge are lost, both in process and content.
• Participation in the process is limited.
• Promulgation of the work can likewise be limited.
• The resulting specifications that become standards are generally not accessible and searchable in a consistent way.
• The quality of the specifications can suffer due to a lack of infrastructure and support.

In the end, regardless of policy and procedure tied to specific SDO, they all need the same basic toolset to support the process. Google has the building blocks in http://code.google.com and “Google Apps for your Domain” to develop http://standards.google.com providing the tool infrastructure and best practices to solve many of the friction problems faced by standards developers.

Regardless of an SDO’s policies and procedures, individual working groups can more easily deliver standards that meet the needs of the SDO and its constituencies in ways that would make the standards more discoverable, accessible, and useable. Using this as the opening olive branch, while developing a strategic standards office would put Google in an excellent position quickly.

Google is in an excellent position to begin their standards strategy function. The effort should be undertaken soon to provide the best most effective platform for success in this strategic area going forward.

A Standards Primer

Photo by Dauvit Alexander

I have recently had several long discussions about the motivations and machinations that surround the development of technology interoperability standards. Over the past few years, I've also captured a lot of ideas and experience on the blog. I pulled it all together into one place in the following paper, "Understanding Technology Standardization Efforts" (PDF 86.2K).

For the record, I was a long term participant in the POSIX and UNIX standardization efforts. I was a working group participant, balloted many pieces of the standards and their amendments, and participated in the management of the standards effort at the IEEE as both an inaugural member of the Project Management Committee and a voting member of the Sponsor Executive Committee. I was an international participant at ISO, as document editor, and participated on behalf of three different national body delegations (Canada, U.S., UK) over a number of years. I began my participation in 1989 as a customer (working for EDS with GM and the U.S. government as their primary POSIX-interested customers), but quickly ended up as a vendor, working for MKS developing a conforming POSIX.2 implementation that formed the basis of implementations from IBM, DEC, HP, UNISYS and Sun. In 1995, I put my money where my mouth was on the importance of applications portability, standards and the coming juggernaut of NT and co-founded Softway Systems, implementing the POSIX and UNIX standards on NT to enable UNIX applications to be directly migrated to the platform. A large amount of free and open source software was incorporated into the product. Softway Systems was acquired by Microsoft in 1999, and I worked there for five years. Over the years I've been in regular contact with people standardizing C#/CLI, the Linux Standards Base, and ODF.

Several friends and colleagues from the standards world have reviewed the paper and provided excellent comments. The paper is much better for it. All mistakes obviously remain my own.

Follow-up on Brad Smith Open Source Business Conference (OSBC) Keynote

It was indeed an interesting keynote. It was not as I had feared it would be. Brad Smith did an excellent job of engaging the audience, explaining the Microsoft position, and encouraging discussion. Smith focused a lot on the diversity in the market of business and licensing models, not claiming a financial high ground (which is a first), and emphasizing shared values (pride of creation of software and what we have collectively accomplished).

The panellists did a fine job, and the audience was also engaged. (It only felt like Smith was filibustering a little in the end, burning the clock, but then he'd had a long time in front of the audience at that point being on the receiving end of the Q&A.) The mini-survey off the previous blog post did correctly predict where most of the discussion was going to be on patents and Linux.

Key points for me:

• "I appreciate that respect for intellectual property is I believe a shared value across our industry." Smith made this statement midway through the panellist Q&A. This to my knowledge is the first public statement by a Microsoft executive that did not label the free and open source community as IP hostile. It is a significant public statement.
• Bottomley and Updegrove did actually catch Smith out in the Q&A. I wouldn't have thought it possible, considering Smith's background as a lawyer and public spokesperson for Microsoft. Smith claims Microsoft wants its property respected, and that patent licensing is not about the relatively small revenue. He was neatly and visibly cornered at one point (to audience chuckles) because the Linux community is willing to respect Microsoft's property and actively work on a solution that avoids it.
• Based on statements made in Sam Ramji's presentation the previous day, and in Brad's keynote and the answers to questions, Microsoft is trying to find solutions to the patent problems. This does not simply mean giving up the property from a Microsoft perspective, as enabling as this might be for the community at large. Smith is all too familiar with other large vendors chasing Microsoft for patent licensing revenues (and he used the Sun US$900M licensing settlement as an example on stage) to be able to understand why Microsoft should just roll over on the patents they allege Linux infringes. For Microsoft it seems it's difficult to take a step that does not appear to be reciprocal in nature.
• There was an interesting discussion about Cathedrals and Bazaars at one point. Smith (Microsoft) is very comfortable having discussions about Cathedrals having licensing discussions with other Cathedrals. But that analogy (historical, relevant, and useful as it has been) also limits their thinking. They seem to only think in terms of Microsoft as a cathedral that can license to other cathedrals. They believe they've enabled the Bazaar in recent licensing statements. It seems they are still trying to understand the actual ecosystem and have been perhaps using the wrong analogy as a lens. Maybe it's time to evolve the Cathedral and the Bazaar.

At one point Smith observed that what the world wants to see is deeds not words — but that words also matter because it sets the bar against which they will be judged. There was lots of interesting things said and debated over the 90 minutes. Smith has set a high very public bar against which Microsoft will be judged. I'm hoping IT Conversations gets this recording up soon so everyone can hear what was said. [My recording is noisy and missing the first few minutes.] Congratulations to Brad Smith, and the panellists (O'Grady, Updegrove, Bottomley, Shuttleworth) for an excellent session, and of course to Matt Asay for pulling it together.

Other commentary:

• Stephen O'Grady commentary
• Matt Asay's direct commentary
• Matt's other commentary

Brad Smith Keynotes the Open Source Business Conference (OSBC)

[Updated (1-Apr-2008 21:37): I posted follow-up commentary in a separate post.

[Updated (12-Mar-2008 13:20): My apologies — Matt Asay points out that there will be a 30 minute slot for questions from the audience after the panel has had 30 minutes. I would still encourage we begin the tuning and discussion early: What would YOU ask Brad Smith at OSBC?]

We're just a couple weeks away from this year's Open Source Business Conference (OSBC) in San Francisco. Brad Smith, general counsel for Microsoft, is the closing keynote on the first day. This speaking slot has previously been filled by the likes of Clayton Christensen, Geoffrey Moore, and Lawrence Lessig, and each of these gentlemen have given us deep talks that have forced one to think about open source in the world at large from an economics, business, and legal perspective. Mr. Smith has large shoes to fill, and this worries me.

You see Mr. Smith is a corporate executive, and most execs (with a few notable exceptions like Mårten Mickos) feel compelled to "pitch the company." Mr. Smith is a lawyer (and general counsel to boot) so language is his oeuvre. We've seen Brad Smith's pitches before now. Here's what I hope we don't see at OSBC:

• A rehash of last's months announcement about how "open" Microsoft is. It is indeed a historical moment for Microsoft, publishing protocol specifications that were previously secret and offering generous patent licensing terms regardless of their motivation. The non-commercial restriction on the open source patent covenant makes it a non-starter. It demonstrates either remarkable naïveté of how the open source world works, or it's a deliberate snub. Either way it's irrelevant and not appropriate for this audience.
• Yet another lecture on how important patents are, the need to get a return on your innovation investment, or that the open source community wants special IP rules. We value IP. We don't want special rules. We understand the patent system and as software business people we often choose different IP tools by the necessity of our size. We also see the likes of most other large vendors sophisticated use of their asset portfolios. Most of us think US$40B per year is a pretty good return on investment. We've all asked to be told which of your patent claims you think we're infringing, so we can fix it. Microsoft is either in the room playing well with the rest of us or it's not. But don't pretend to play. That's boring and transparent. (The wrong sort of transparent.)
• More declarations on patent licensing innovation with Novell, Xandros, et al. Those are business cross licenses. Really. Move on. You're being lapped by the likes of IBM, Sun, and Oracle with respect to business innovation and open source.

So let's turn it around. What GREAT things could Mr. Smith announce to demonstrate that the Microsoft executive team gets open source software and they actually want to engage? What property or asset could they liberally share into a collaborative development community (that includes businesses), instead of publishing yet more licenses or making positioning statements? In essence, what could they DO. How about:

• Announce the release of the Sharepoint software base as open source software. Let the world know you will be genuinely exploring the revenue streams of support/maintenance/network in the context of this line of business, while encouraging innovation on the platform, and encouraging a community engagement unlike others in the Microsoft world.
• If he wants to talk about patents, then back up the earlier CIFS/Samba announcements with unrestricted patent covenants to any patents required, and scope the covenant to implementing CIFS. This seems a reasonable way to encourage the community (including businesses) while clearly stating the conditions under which infringement will not be tolerated outside of CIFS implementations.

At the end of the keynote, questions have been limited to a distinguished panel consisting of Stephen O'Grady (Redmonk), James Bottomly (SteelEye CTO), Mark Shuttleworth (Ubuntu/Canonical), and Andy Updegrove (Gesmer Updegrove). I started to think about what I would want to ask and came up with the following:

Question: If you have the list of patents whose claims you believe are infringed by Linux, why won't you release it such that the community can deliver on its statement that they will fix the infringements?

Rationale: Regardless of how some people in the free and open source community feel about software patents, we all understand that it is the legal system we have in place. We all understand that changing that system is a different discussion. The community deeply respects intellectual property. The entire free and open source licensing space is based on strong IP law. People want to fix infringed claims. But we can't fix what you won't share.

Question: Why doesn't Microsoft share more software under open source licenses?

Rationale: Microsoft has a wealth of software assets that are not products. So take the discussion of "not a business model we can embrace" off the table. Microsoft has been "studying" open source and "learning" from open source for almost a decade. No one is suggesting the release of the Windows or Office software base. Why have so few small experiments been done?

But we live in the Internet age. I would love to hear what other ideas and questions people have. So here's a web site that will allow you to enter your questions and ideas, and vote on the others already in place: "What would YOU ask Brad Smith at OSBC?"

Thanks to Sandro Groganz for putting the survey site together so quickly once I asked.

Microsoft Open Source ISV Forum at OSBC

The Microsoft ISV team is again hosting the Microsoft Open Source ISV Forum prior to the Open Source Business Conference in San Francisco in a few weeks.

Last year was a really good event. It was well attended (about 120 people). Sam Ramji spent an hour with the group in open discussion around the challenges of open source at Microsoft and progress made. It was a particularly important discussion at the time because of a Fortune article the week before the forum. There was lots of good commentary in booth directions around such things as IP management. Stephen O'Grady (Redmonk) also presented and was his regularly inimitable self. John Roberts (SugarCRM CEO) spoke about their partner relationship with Microsoft, and the ISV team explained the opportunities available through the NXT program.

This year they're tightening the agenda up. The event starts with lunch and registration from 11:30am, and the event begins properly at 12:30pm. (You won't necessarily need the extra night in the hotel to attend.) Sam will speak again this year, as will Stephen. New ISV partners will present, as well as a panel discussion from a new collection of venture capitalists. If you're an ISV, it promises to be a good half day event to warm up before tackling OSBC itself.

Registration is free and the site is now open. As an added incentive, ISVs that attend the Microsoft Open Source ISV Forum get 50% off the two-day registration for OSBC.

The OOXML Ballot Resolution

[Update (2008-2-25 13:45): There's an excellent press release from ISO that outlines exact history and next steps and requirements for this ballot.]

I have long maintained that technology standardization is commercial diplomacy and the purpose of individual participants (as with all diplomats) is to expand one's area of economic influence while defending sovereign territory. This week a lot of people are gathering in Geneva for the ISO ballot resolution meeting for Office Open XML (OOXML), Microsoft's Office product specification. The debate no doubt will be contentious.

Microsoft had a perfect opportunity to participate in the Open Document Format (ODF) standard's development at OASIS. They ignored that opportunity. The best time for technology standardization arises when a problem space is well understood, with sufficient real implementation knowledge to discern what works and what doesn't. Microsoft had arguably the best experience to contribute. They chose not to participate. Standardized document formats with multiple product implementations posed a threat to their Office business.

That threat became real when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts chose ODF as a basis for product procurement to best serve its citizens. Microsoft's response was not to adopt the ODF standard that already existed with multiple implementations (and continues to act as a hub for alignment with other international work like China's UOF standard), but to rush their own product specification into the standardization process.

They have over the two year process done a remarkable amount of work to bring the specification through ECMA to ISO, and have made great gestures to enable others to support the Microsoft specification.

But there's a problem.

Microsoft is an adjudicated monopoly in the United States. The EU continues to investigate possible abuse of their market dominance. (Market leadership and innovation are not what's being punished, but rather the abuse of a dominant position.) Microsoft can complain all they want, but the practices that enabled their success continue to plague them. We cannot collectively rewrite history. Microsoft is indeed held to a different measure. They have forfeited some of the freedoms that other companies enjoy. In many ways, they have lost our trust.

One can not judge Microsoft's newly declared preference for "openness" against the work they've done promoting their own product specification, but against their continued refusal to adopt ODF. In the end, OOXML as an ISO standard (with its attendant market confusion) will best serve the needs of Microsoft over its customers, and that's a shame.

Andy Updegrove has an excellent essay on his blog as we go into this week's ballot resolution deliberations. He takes a different approach. In it he argues that a particular class of standards should be held to a higher bar for acceptance, because they enable fundamental technology access in the world going forward. He makes an compelling case for why OOXML should be flunked out of the ISO process.

This promises to be a fascinating week.